Abstract:Based on the social actor theory and the multiple institutional logics framework,this paper analysed the policy evolution and institutional logics of the first-level construction land allocation in China from the perspective of interaction between central and local governments. This paper found that the central and local governments,affected by the multiple logics,established differential codes of conduct for different types of land use planning quotas in the process of institutional change. For the incremental construction land quota,both parties adopted an incompatible rule:control and breach,under the influence of the central government’s authority validity and the local governments’ self-interest and discretion. While for the non-incremental construction land quota,both parties adopted a compatible rule:decentralization and implementation,under the influence of the central government’s strong publicity and authority validity,and the local governments’ discretion. Through the continuous interactions between central and local governments,the institutional change of the construction land allocation has been shaped as a dual-track change path including the stricter “plan control” for incremental construction land and the more flexible “market adjustment” for the non-incremental construction land. Therefore,under the differential codes of conduct of central and local governments,China’s future construction land allocation reform is expected to depend on not only the change of governance structure by introducing market mechanism,but also the multiple logics,management demands and interaction between both parties under the highly centralized system of land management,so as to design an institutional improvement mechanism which guides the central and local governments to be compatible and complementary.