村社公共事务支出、农民财产权益与集体经济组织内部收益分配机制研究
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1.华中农业大学 公共管理学院,湖北 武汉 430070;2.华中师范大学 政治学部/公共管理学院,湖北 武汉 430079

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为通讯作者。

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F810.4

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国家自然科学基金项目“农地城市流转中价值创造过程、价值捕获机制与利益共享政策研究”(71873053);国家自然科学基金青年项目“农村土地制度变迁中农民土地财产权决策逻辑与实现机制的研究”(72204096);中国博士后科学基金第16批特别资助(站中)项目“区位条件对宅基地价值实现的影响及入市改革路径选择的研究”(2023T160255)。


Analysis of Village Public Affairs Expenditure, Farmers’ Property Rights and Interests, and the Internal Profit Distribution Mechanism of Collective Economic Organizations
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    摘要:

    平衡集体经济收益的提留与分红比例有助于发展集体公共事务与保障农民财产权益双目标的实现。从财务收支平衡的视角,构建村社集体经济组织收益分配机制的理论分析框架,基于2016年和2024年对佛山市南海区176个村社的跟踪调查,探讨集体与个人间的经济收益分配机制。结果发现:第一,在“自由探索”阶段,村社倾向于为村民股东分配更高的收益份额,样本村社集体提留比例平均值约为31.5%;第二,公共事务支出越高的村社,集体的收益提留比例越高,经济条件越好的村社,集体提留比例越低;第三,“分六留四”政策落实阶段,集体提留比例均值上升到41.9%,集体公共事务支出增加,村社治理水平提升。“分六留四”政策通过“刚性指导”和“柔性执行”,既保障了农民财产权益,又提高了村社“自我造血”能力。

    Abstract:

    Balancing the retention and distribution ratios of collective economic earnings is crucial for achieving the dual objectives of developing collective public affairs and safeguarding farmers’ property rights. This study constructs a theoretical framework for analyzing the profit distribution mechanism within collective economic organizations from the perspective of financial revenue and expenditure balance. Based on longitudinal surveys conducted in 176 village in Nanhai District, Foshan City in both 2017 and 2024, the study delves into the distribution mechanism of economic benefits between the collective and individuals, as well as the effect of raising the collective retention ratio on the governance of village. The findings are as follows: First, during the “free exploration” phase, villages tended to allocate a larger share of earnings to shareholder villagers, with an average collective retention ratio of about 31% in sample villages in 2016. Second, villages with higher expenditures on public affairs have higher collective retention ratios, while wealthier villages have lower collective retention ratios. Third, during the implementation of the “60% distributed, 40% retained” policy from 2016 to 2024, the average collective retention ratio has risen to 41.9%, accompanied by a rise in public affairs spending and improvements in village governance. The “ 60% distributed, 40% retained” policy, through a combination of “ strict guidance” and “flexible implementation”,not only safeguards farmers’ property rights and interests, but also enhances the village’s capacity for self-sustainability.

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夏炜祁,张安录,张明辉.村社公共事务支出、农民财产权益与集体经济组织内部收益分配机制研究[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2024(6):159-173

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  • 收稿日期:2024-02-21
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  • 在线发布日期: 2024-11-15
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