As the main subjects of China’s grain reserves,farmers and local grain enterprises play an important role in ensuring food security,but they are often driven by self-interest to perform reverse operations,which thus seriously influences the effects of national grain reserve macro-control policy.This paper,based on different grain reserve subjects,builds the Game Model.The result shows that as for farmers,their grain reserve behaviors have a great imitation and convergence characteristics,and their irrational expectation of future food prices is an important reason for their reverse behaviors.Government should both guide farmers to form rational expectations about the future food prices and affect farmer’s income so as to affect their final decision through subsidy policy of grain reserve.As for the main grain reserve enterprises,this paper proves that their reverse operation behaviors are the inevitable result of the pursuit of maximization profit and the game without outside intervention will ultimately cause the reduction of effect of food reserve policy control.Therefore,government should encourage the China Grain Reserves Corporation to play the leading role in influencing grain enterprises’ expectation or introduce the policy subsidies to influence the game’s proceeds and form positive guidance and incentives for grain enterprises,which will make the implementation of grain storage policy become the optimal choice under their maximization interests,and fundamentally avoid the reverse operation of grain enterprises.