Evolutionary game models under three conditions are structured for the basin whose water environment has been disrupted seriously.The three evolutionary game models have analyzed the eco-compensation tactics of this kind of basin progressively.Some findings have been caught.Firstly,the evolutionary stable strategy (for short ESS) without upper government’s participation is (no restoration and no compensation).Obviously,the ESS cannot reach the goal of ecological restoration.Secondly,upper government’s participation is brought into the evolutionary game model.However,the ideal ESS (restoration and compensation) cannot be ideally reached too.Thirdly,the precondition is that upper government undertakes the cost of ecological restoration and the task to enact constraint mechanism to regulate the behavior of upstream and downstream.From the third model,a conclusion has been obtained.When the economic benefits and government’s subsidy outnumber the cost of ecological restoration,the upstream will choose restoration.When the fine outnumbers the cost for compensation,the downstream will choose restoration too.And the ESS is restoration and compensation in this case.It is evident that the eco-compensation pattern with the participation of both upper government and downstream will be testified to be the ideal pattern for the basin with seriously disrupted water environment.