Abstract:This paper uses principal agent theory to analyze the principal-agent relationship in the prevention of land expropriation conflicts and puts forward the corresponding incentive measures. In order to obtain the “Pareto improvement”,local governments and village committees concluded prevention contract,but due to the defects of implicit contract and asymmetric information,the latter is prone to adverse selection and moral hazard caused by principal-agent relationship rupture. Based on the theoretical model,this paper discusses the improvement measures of local government to effectively encourage the village committee to prevent land expropriation conflicts and proposes some countermeasures and suggestions. Firstly,the villagers and developers are considered to be fitted into the framework of contract and supervised by the society so as to strengthen the restraint power of implicit contract. Secondly,from the point of signal transmission and signal screening,it is required to levy project consultant,establish performance evaluation mechanism,which is conducive to risk prevention,maintaining the stable and efficient operation of principal-agent relationship. Thirdly,as for political preference type village committees,political promotion and reward can be anticipated to reduce the risk of adverse selection. Finally,as for the economic preference village committees,it may be appropriate to increase the proportion of income distribution and increase the cost of violation of law so as to prevent moral hazard.