Based on the case study of the practice of targeted poverty alleviation in L Village,it is found that the system inversion and the accumulation of “Qi” among villagers result from the facts that villagers strive to be poor households,poverty alleviation projects are implemented in an unbalanced way,and the poverty alleviation industry develops in a task-based manner.Under this background,the grassroots regime has constructed a strategic mechanism to reconcile the conflicts in villages by means of policy adaptation under the scenario of game theory,the principle of selective equilibrium in village political life and taking different measures according to different circumstances so as to achieve efficiency in policy implementation.Because of the breakage of the relationship between governance subjects and the asymmetry between governance structure and governance ability,the paradox of non-equilibrium governance is presented in rural targeted poverty alleviation.So,in the current policy practice of targeted poverty alleviation in rural areas,it is necessary to construct a system of balanced governance to speed up the modernization of poverty control system and governance capacity.