The policy-based guarantee mechanism effectively alleviates the financing predicament of “agriculture， rural areas and farmers” by serving as a “third-party” collateral substitute.However，it remains doubtful whether “guaranteed support for agriculture”necessarily supports the target farmers.This paper uses the data of 370 farmers and herdsmen who have obtained policy-based guarantee loans in three cities of Inner Mongolia，and tests the differential effects of policy-based guarantee mechanism on the credit availability of agricultural and animal husbandry operators with different attributes and characteristics from the perspective of information screening.It is found that policy-backed loans tend to be issued to “political elites capture and anti-collateral product often goes first”，which deviates from the original policy intention of “supporting high-growth subjects and weakening mortgage guarantee”.This conclusion still holds after considering possible endogeneity problems and a series of robustness tests.Further research shows that the “political elite” strategy will lead to a certain degree of moral hazard；The heterogeneity analysis results show that for areas with high government intervention and low development degree of digital inclusive finance，policy-based guarantee mechanism plays a more obvious role in increasing the possibility for “political elites” and anti-collateral agricultural and animal husbandry operators to get credit. Accordingly，this paper puts forward policy suggestions to realize the high-quality development of agricultural credit guarantee system from the perspectives of growth priority，risk aversion，industrialization layout and digital empowerment.