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48                             华中农业大学学报(社会科学版)                                 (总161 期)


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                       A New Explanation of Relationship Between Accountability and
                                 Blame Avoidance:Based on the Framework of

                                       “Action-Institution-Environment”




                                                      TIAN Xianhong
                    Abstract  The relationship between accountability and blame avoidance is an important topic in the

                study of responsibility politics where the mechanisms by which accountability leads to blame avoidance
                needs to be explored urgently. Taking the early rice crop production policy process in X County as an ex⁃
                ample, this paper discusses the relationship mechanism between accountability at higher-level and blame
                avoidance of lower-level, based on the analytical framework of“action-institution-environment”. The
                study found that the blame avoidance behavior of grassroots cadres is the result of the joint effect of the
                accountability system at the higher level and the social environment at the lower level, and it is the ratio⁃
                nal choice of the grassroots cadres as those responsible in the face of the pressure of accountability from
                the higher level and the resistance of farmers. In order to implement the non-grain rectification policy,
                the superiors have imposed huge pressure on the grassroots cadres through responsibility distribution, re⁃
                sponsibility assessment and supervision and accountability systems. The farmers, nevertheless, have de⁃
                veloped a relatively stable production order dominated by the middle rice crop planting model over the
                long-term production history and refused to implement the early rice crop production policy. Grassroots
                cadres who are under double pressure can only adopt a territorialization mechanism of responsibility un⁃
                derwriting, the market-oriented mechanism for exchanging interests, and the bureaucratic mechanism for
                joint responsibility avoidance to avoid the rist of accoutablity at higher levels. The grassroots cadres who
                are the actors use their discretionary power to change the existing institution-environment to a certain ex⁃
                tent and recreate the grassroots governance structure by concealing information and collective indebted⁃
                ness.
                    Key words   accountability; blame avoidance; risk; responsibility politics

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